Product Description

Defining speciesism as "a failure, in attitude or practice, to accord any nonhuman being equal consideration and respect," this brilliant work critiques speciesism both outside and inside the animal rights movement. Much moral philosophy, legal theory, and animal advocacy aimed at advancing nonhuman emancipation actually perpetuate speciesism, the book demonstrates. Speciesism examines philosophy, law, and activism in terms of three categories: "old speciesism," "new speciesism," and species equality.

Old-speciesists limit rights to humans. Speciesism refutes their standard arguments against nonhuman rights. Current law is old-speciesist; legally, nonhumans have no rights. "Animal laws" such as the Humane Slaughter Act afford nonhumans no meaningful protection, Dunayer shows. She also explains why welfarist campaigns are old-speciesist. Instead of opposing the abuse or killing of nonhuman beings, such campaigns seek only to make abuse or killing less cruel; they propose alternative ways of violating nonhumans’ moral rights. Many organizations that consider themselves animal rights engage in old-speciesist campaigns, which reinforce the property status of nonhumans rather than promote their emancipation.

New-speciesists espouse rights for only some nonhumans, those whose minds seem most like humans’. In addition to devaluing most animals, new-speciesists give greater moral consideration and stronger basic rights to humans than to any nonhumans. They see animalkind as a hierarchy with humans at the top. Dunayer explains why she categorizes such theorists as Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Steven Wise as new-speciesists.

Nonspeciesists advocate rights for every sentient being. Speciesism makes the case that every creature with a nervous system should be regarded as sentient. The book provides compelling evidence of consciousness in animals often dismissed as insentient—such as fishes, insects, spiders, and snails. Dunayer argues that every sentient being should possess basic legal rights, including rights to life and liberty. Radically egalitarian, Speciesism envisions nonspeciesist thought, law, and action.

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Highly recommended        Rating:

Dunayer's Speciesism dismantles speciesist ideology and develops an egalitarian animal rights philosophy.

The opening chapter defines speciesism and, with comparisons to racism and sexism, logically argues that excluding any sentient being from the moral community is speciesist.

The first two sections are Old Speciesism and New Speciesism. Old speciesism is the status quo, rights for only human animals. Dunayer shows how this philosophy disregards the interests of nonhuman animals, whom the law regards as property and exploitable resources. Old-speciesist advocacy is about modifying the conditions under which nonhuman animals are enslaved and murdered. New speciesism extends rights to some nonhuman animals, primarily on the basis of their being "human-like." Dunayer makes the case that this philosophy creates an unjust hierarchy in which human-like rather than sentient is the standard for personhood. In contrast, sentience-based arguments break down the species barrier.

The final section, Animal Equality, develops a nonspeciesist framework with rights for all animals. This philosophy accords all sentient beings equal consideration and respect. Liberated from property status, nonhuman animals receive all applicable rights as persons under the law. Nonhuman rights to life and liberty restrain humans from breeding, confining, exploiting, or intentionally and needlessly killing other animals. Joining these basic rights is a nonhuman right to property, understood as including nonhumans' bodily secretions (e.g., milk, eggs, and honey), what nonhumans build (e.g., nests and dens), and their natural habitats ("undeveloped" areas communally owned by their nonhuman residents). Without the right to property, other animals have no legal protection from humans who assert property rights to expand industrial civilization, displacing nonhumans from their territory and destroying their means of survival. Nonspeciesist advocacy, such as promoting veganism and animal rights, erodes speciesism and advances nonhuman emancipation.

Written clearly and concisely, this book lights the path to justice for all sentient beings. Advocates for nonhuman animals will greatly benefit from this rational, motivating, and compellingly argued book.

Taking Sentience Seriously        Rating:

Joan Dunayer, author of the excellent Animal Equality, has written another very fine and original book. In SPECIESISM, she defends the equal moral significance of every sentient being. In the course of doing so, she thoroughly discusses and criticizes "Old Speciesism," "New Speciesism," and the nonhuman-animal advocacy groups who actually espouse the notions of either of these views. Her final three chapters are devoted to truly nonspeciesist philosophy, law, and a program for nonspeciesist advocacy. While some of the philosophers she discusses will not agree with every criticism she raises against their views, she is dead on target in many of her arguments. Her discussion of much of our current law, "Old Speciesist" to the core, is a horrifyingly detailed exposition of slave trade law. The legal "reforms" advanced by "New Speciesists" are also exposed as bows to human superiority: the more intelligent the nonhuman animal is; i.e., the closer to us the nonhuman is, the bigger and cleaner the cages get to be.

One of the several great services SPECIESISM performs is Dunayer's presentation of compelling scientific evidence for the sentience of invertebrates. There are many, many nonhuman animals deserving of equal moral significance with human animals if Dunayer is right. She shows too how it would actually be possible to implement these principles of respect. She offers a realistic scenario for legal change, change that would take place gradually, as more humans are persuaded against speciesism. SPECIESISM is a significant contribution to the realization of a genuinely moral way of life.

Finally, a complete treatment of animal rights and the implications thereof        Rating:

In this book, Dunayer essentially does the following:

- Defines speciesism, while refuting some others' definitions
- Identifies and descibes what she calls "old speciesism" and "new speciesism"
- Identifies non-speciesist philosophy, gives its legal implications, and suggestions of its advocacy

It doesn't sound too exciting, especially if you're new to animal rights. I don't see this book as for those new to the idea, but rather people already familiar with and advocates of animal rights.

I've read all the 'classic' animal rights philosophy books, after pretty much having reached my own conclusions. I was surprised to read these "groundbreaking" books and find myself more extreme than them, and ultimately considering their ideas a little too conservative, even if radical in comparison to the social norm. This is where Dunayer's work is different. No matter how much of an animal advocate you are, you'll find yourself thinking *she* has perhaps gone too far, only to find that this thought is based on what you claim to fight against: speciesism.

Dunayer lays out a clear and convincing case of not only the definition of speciesism or that it exists, but why it is an invalid standard to base judgment. Through a few Supreme Court examples among others, she demonstrates that our disregarding of nonhumans' interests is not so much based in their intelligence, autonomy, or capacity to be social, but simply the fact that they are not human. She also dismisses holding nonhuman animals to a human standard for evaluating their moral worth - because this is simply a circle of "human traits are superior because they are human." It all comes down to species, not merit, not intelligence.

She gives us an alternative: judgment on the basis of sentience. She also redefines sentience rather radically not to mean the capacity to suffer/feel pleasure but simple consciousness, on the basis that some humans are incapable of feeling pain.

She insists that all animals not only be given consideration but equal consideration, something that is lacking (even if it claims not to be) in essentially any other animal rights literature. After making such a point, she projects its legal implications, including the idea of granting personhood to all sentient animals and the implications therof as well.

That's where I thought it had gone perhaps too far for even me. But that's because we associate "personhood" with "humanhood" and citizenship, with things like voting, driving, or the right to protest. But essentially, personhood is the basis of protection under the law and having one's interests represented in court.

The only practical problem I find with her argument is nonhumans' right to property, particularly their living space - since it makes a moral dilemma of whether to evict mice from a house and destroy their home in order to make the area into a larger living complex, as to take away urban sprawl. But that's it.

Ultimately, she provides advice of what constitutes non-speciesist animal rights advocacy, not condemning trying to grant personhood to one species at a time, but rather if the method used to do so would impede granting personhood to other species. In other words, she's not an all-or-nothing advocate, not saying that all animals should be granted personhood at once or not at all, but she does point out that many tactics trying to legally elevate certain species leaves others potentially worse off than they began.

Wherever you stand on animal rights, this is a compelling, thought-provoking book. You'll be questioning and re-evaluating your values, no matter how non-radical or radical. Even if you don't agree with her conclusions, you'll be wondering how arbitrary your standards are.

I find Dunayer's work to finally be a complete treatment of animal rights. It addresses speciesism from blatant to subtle, the practicality of certain kinds of advocacy, and the danger of creating a new form of speciesism by trying to advance (certain) animals' rights. She rationally explains why rights advocates should not support "welfarist" campaigns and addresses other issues pertinent to helping current advocates further eliminating speciesism from their thoughts and practice.

A great read and provocative book.

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